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Abstract
The following analysis examines the nature of the contemporary extreme right in Europe. It is argued that in
most academic reviews the approach of the phenomenon has been based on historical, socio-economic, political
and ideologico-cultural variables. Accordingly, the extreme right is seen as a) the revival of the fascist era; b)
the by-product of post-industrial changes; c) protest politics and d) a xenophobic discourse. The article adopts
an eclectic approach, which favours the compl mentarity among the different variables and allows for some
flexibility at the level of the national case studies. Based on a critical appraisal of existing academic arguments,
it is suggested that most analyses have concentrated on the Western European experience and have neglected
the Eastern European framework of the extreme right. The article highlights the need for a comprehensive
approach on Eastern Europe and attempts to draw some comparative points. Finally, it assesses the way
European mainstream political forces perceive the phenomenon and the way they act when faced with its
dangerous implications. A need for a differentiated approach is suggested, which takes into account the
regional and national specificities of extremism in the European setting.
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Introduction
Right wing extremism has extensively preoccupied the minds of politicians, social scientists,
the media and the public, at large. Its has been applied to radical political parties, fringe
organisations, clandestine groups and a range of violent racist activities. While the
phenomenon has been marginal in the context of mainstream democratic politics, it is endemic
in most societies of the advanced world. Its significance varies across time and place,
depending on the performance of radical right wing parties in national elections or the
frequency of aggressive and violent actions by marginal groups and individuals.
During the 1990s, the revival of nationalism in Eastern Europe, the break-up of the Soviet
Union and the continuous presence of radical right parties in Western Europe have renewed
the academic and journalistic interest on the extreme right. The most well known
manifestations of the 1990s radical right include the flare-up of Neo-Nazi violence in
Germany, the growing strength of the National Front in France, the electoral success of
Zhirinovsky in Russia, the inclusion of Allianza Nazionale in Berlusconi’s government, the
participation of the Slovak National Party in the government in Slovakia and the electoral
successes of the Freedom Party in Austria, the People’s Party in Switzerland and the Vlaams
Bloc in Belgium. Furthermore, nationalist wars, ethnic cleansing and concentration camps in
the former Yugoslavia have been viewed as aggressive manifestations of current extremism
and ultra-nationalism in 1990s Europe. At the beginning of the new century, the extreme right
seems to be acquiring increasing momentum with the participation of the Freedom Party, in
the government of Austria. Th s is a novel experience as it is the first time in the post-war
period that an extreme right party is participating as an equal partner in a government of a
European country, which has made European citizens realise that the extreme right is not to be
regarded as an exclusively fringe phenomenon but as a force that can penetrate mainstream
democratic politics.
The resilience and occasional rise of the radical right poses a serious challenge for social
scientists and policy makers. Social scientists are called upon to examine the nature of the
phenomenon, the factors conducive to the existence and resilience of the forces of extremism
and the impact of far right political mobilisation within national societies and Europe, at large.
Governments and policy makers for their part explore ways to marginalise these forces in
order to sustain -in Western Europe- and consolidate -in Eastern Europe- democracy in the
continent.
But is there a real and sufficient knowledge on the nature and the dynamics of the
phenomenon? Bearing in mind the charged historical legacy of fascism in post-war
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developments, to what extent does the current extreme right constitute a contemporary
expression of the inter-war phenomenon? What accounts for the successful political
mobilisation of extreme right parties in some countries of Europe and is there a real threat of
contagion for other countries? How have those in the scholarly community and in the
government circles responded to the radical right challenge? These are some of the central
questions addressed in this article which seeks to offer a comprehensive and comparative
assessment of the contemporary European extreme right. It is important to have a clear
understanding of what this political force represents in order to deal more effectively with its
implications.
Definitional Shortcomings
The paper starts with a systematic and critical appraisal of the current literature on the extreme
right, by identifying the main strengths and weaknesses of the current debate. Despite the
substantial amount of analyses and empirical research on the European extreme right, our
understanding of the current phenomenon remains surprisingly piecemeal. The first thing that
comes to mind when considering the existing literature on the extreme right is the lack of a
common definition to guide inquiry and give coherence to the phenomenon. While the extreme
right is easily recognisable, there is virtually an absence of definition in most of the existing
scholarly studies. Some have defined the extreme right in terms of opposition to democracy,
and others in terms of racist and ultra-nationalistic attitudes. Others have located the
phenomenon along the left-right political continuum. Most studies in the field have
concentrated on the examination of the particular parties and movements in country specific
analyses.
The overall picture is even more confusing when one considers the variety of terminologies to
label the phenomenon. The long list of labels includes the terms of “radical right” and “far
1, “mimetic or nostalgic fascism”2 “new populism”3, “radical right-wing
populism”4, “new right”5, “new post-industrial extreme right”6 and “new radical right”7.
Naturally, all these labels converge to some common attributes, characteristic of the extreme
right. Each of these, however, implies a different emphasis that each scholar places in his own
analysis.
                                         
1 Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson & Michalina Vaughan (eds) Neo-Fascism in Europe, (New York: Longman, 1991).
2 See Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, (London: Routledge, 1993).
3 Hans-Georg Betz & Srefan Immerfall (eds) The Politics of the Right; Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established
Democracies, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).
4 See L. Helms “Right-Wing Populist Parties in Austria and Switzerland”, West European Politics 20 (2) pp. 37-52 and
Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, (New York: St Martin's Press 1994).
5 See Michael Minkenberg, “The New Right in France and Germany” in The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the
Nineties edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
6 Piero Ignazi “The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey” in Th  Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, ibid, pp.
47-64.
7 Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe; A Comparative Analysis, (Univer ty of Michigan Press, 1997)
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The complex nature of the phenomenon is accentuated by the existence of a variety of radical
right parties and groups in the different national settings. These may be nationalist populist
parties, nationalist regionalist or nationalist with authoritarian leanings. In a wider sense, the
extreme right may also include various fringe groupuscules in the form of militant youth
movements, skinheads and militia groups, -prone towards violence and direct provocations
against civil society- as well as "direct leftovers from the fascist era"8. Such a multitude of
cases makes it hard to identify which party or group is more or less representative of the
extreme right political family. This leads to a difficulty in the categorisation of the extreme
right cases, which is mainly due to the "organisational complexity and ideological
heterogeneity"9 of the phenomenon. There is, however, a wider consensus among scholars
that there is no ideal type in Europe although the French National Front has been considered a
characteristic type, based mostly on its successful and lasting representation in the French
party system.
Three initial shortcomings can be therefore identified in the study of the extreme right: a lack
of a commonly accepted definition, a confusing terminology and a difficulty in the
categorisation of the variety of cases that belong to the extreme right political family. One of
the major premises of the following study is that although the extreme right is an identifiable
pan-European political force, it is at the same time, nationally specific, by virtue of its ultra-
nationalistic and xenophobic character. This characteristic does not allow much space for easy
generalisations and common approaches, at the European level.
A. Approaches to the Phenomenon
Despite the above mentioned shortcomings, it may be possible to draw some general and
systematic comments on the way in which analysts and social scientists have approached the
study of the extreme right. Based on a comparative assessment of the current literature, one
can define four general approaches/dimensions that are related to the rise, resilience and nature
of the extreme right: (1) historical, (2) structural, (3) political (4) ideologico-cultural. The
historical is connected with the fascist legacy of the inter-war period. The structural refers to
the socio-economic context conducive to the phenomenon. The political emphasises the role
of political actors who by their actions can influence the course of events leading to the
increasing or decreasing importance of extreme right forces. The ide logico-cultural traces the
                                         
8 These are small parties and groups composed by a mix of veterans, former middle class or lower rank members of the
classic inter-war parties, and of people of the higher age groups in societies. See Stein Ugelvik Larsen, “Overcoming the
Past when Shaping the Future” in Modern Europe After Fascism 1943-1980s edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, (Social
Science Monographs, Boulder, New York: Columbia University, 1998), pp. 1777-1844.
9 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, op.cit., p. 170.
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historical continuity and significance of radical ideas and focuses, in the majority of cases, on
the racist and xenophobic nature of the extreme right discourse. Each of these
approaches/dimensions concentrates on the study of different variables, as shown in diagram
No 1.
Diagram No 1
Defining Dimensions of the Contemporary European Extreme Right
Historical  Structural
A B
Fascist legacy Socio-economic change
extreme right
Protest politics Xenophobic platform
C D
Political            Ideologico-cultural
Based on this initial scheme, I shall examine the validity of four different theses, which are
dominant in the current literature:
· Historical: the extreme right as the revival of the fascist era;
· Structural: the extreme right as the by-product of post-industrial changes;
· Political: the extreme right as protest politics;
· Ideological: the extreme right as a xenophobic discourse.
The following analysis will favour an eclectic approach of the historical, structural, political
and ideological dimensions, reflecting the compl mentarity among the approaches and
allowing for some flexibility in each particular case. It will also point out two important
shortcomings in the study of the contemporary extreme right in Europe. The first refers to a
lack of a comparative pan-European perspective and an inadequate understanding of the
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Eastern European conditions and circumstances that breed extreme right forces. The validity
of the above mentioned four theses will be, therefore, tested in the Eastern European region in
order to draw some tentative comparative remarks. The second shortcoming refers to a lack of
a consistent strategic analysis regarding the way mainstream political forces perceive the
phenomenon and act upon it when faced with its dangerous implications.
1. Historical Approach; the Fascist Legacy
The fascist legacy constitutes a significant variable and a perennial issue in most of the studies
of the extreme right. By relating the current extreme right with fascism, scholars have tried to
stress the historical continuity of that trend of political thought and behaviour, and attempted
to define the political and ideological space of contemporary extremism. There are some
persistent questions that seem to preoccupy all those who are involved in the study of right-
wing extremism. Are current radical right-wing expressions, a new version of the movements
of the 1930s?  Are the notions of xenophobia, racism, ethnic chauvinism and anti-Semitism, in
part, a historical rebirth of earlier and darker European philosophies? Are there any novel
features that give virulent nationalism and right-wing extremism a different face? In other
words, the debate of the extreme right is also a debate over fascism’s return or perhaps its
continuing and continuous presence in contemporary life.10
By and large, fascism, as a historical phenomenon was born in the aftermath of the First World
War, in a volatile international environment of defeated empires, hurt nationalistic feelings and
the rise of the communist influence. Fascism was triggered by a severe socio-economic crisis,
which in the cases of industrialised economies came as a response to an organised working
class movement. Its power alliance combined the fascist party leadership, traditional elites of
industry, banking and the military. Its social base was quite heterogeneous. It started by
attracting disenchanted individuals and groups and ended up by being a catch all party of,
among others, disillusioned petty-bourgeois city dwellers, peasants and intellectuals. As a
latecomer in the political scene of an already crystallised party-system,11 it manag d to create
a distinct style of political behaviour based on an activist party organisation, the cult of
leadership, terror, and fanaticism beyond the limits of legality.12 It was a terrorist regime,
fiercely anticommunist, which rejected parliamentary democracy and allowed no political
opposition. Fascism employed an all-encompassing totalitarian ideology to manipulate its mass
following. Through the means of party mobilisation, it involved different sectors of the
                                         
10 Many writers and historians involved in the examination of the radical right have been wondering, whether we have
been witnessing, a “revival of fascism” in the 1990s. See Richard J.Golsan (ed) Fascism’s Return, (University of Nebraska
Press, 1998).
11 See Juan Linz, "Some Notes towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective" in Fascism
A Reader's Guide, edited by Walter Laqueur (Wildwood House, 1988), pp. 3-121.
12 See Noel O’Sullivan, Fascism (London: J.M.Dent 7 Sons, 1983).
Othon Anastasakis
8
population in the support of a distinctly aggressive nationalist discourse, combined with
emotion and action and a propensity for political violence and war.
Fascism as a political force of the inter-war period with an international appeal, emerged in
different national settings. Its essence is to be found in its national variations in the particular
period that the phenomenon dominated the European context. As Bideleux argues:
Every manifestation of fascism was of necessity unique, reflecting the particular conjuncture of forces
and events in each country and in the Continent as a whole at the time of its emergence and of its
subsequent struggle for political power and popular support. Each exploited and drew upon its own
specific national roots, traditions, preoccupations, ideologies and political, social, cultural and economic
context…. each unique national manifestation of fascism was just one of many possible variants or
expressions of a more general and deep-seated twentieth century phenomenon, brought about by a
distinctive new stage in the development of European capitalism and/or by the rise of increasingly
illiberal and extreme forms of nationalism, racism, political activism and mass politics, tending towards
more totalitarian forms of governance and mass mobilisation.13
What is extraordinary with inter-war fascism is the influence and magnetism of its ideological
and mobilisational components throughout the European continent and beyond. A multitude of
authoritarian regimes and movements attest to the expansion of the phenomenon during the
inter-war period. Yet, despite the big number of national cases (parties, movements and
regimes) it has been very difficult to identify an “ideal type” of fascism based on the existing
national experiences. The Italian and German regimes, however, have been repeatedly and
deservedly singled out as the most representative examples of fascism.14
Fascism has attracted massive attention from the community of scholars confirmed by the
significant and growing amount of relevant publications. Apart from the particular cases of
Germany and Italy, the historical and comparative study of generic fascism has instigated a
broad debate among intellectuals. 15 Yet, despite the numerous accounts, fascism remains, by
and large, a “slippery and resistant to interpretation and even to basic definition
                                         
13 Bideleux and Jeffries, A History of Eastern Europe:Crisis and Change (Routlegde, 1998), p 483.
14 Guy Hermet argues convincingly that the Italian regime could be considered the “fascist prototype” which did not
manage to attain its ideological goal of the totalitarian organisation of Italian society, and the Nazi case as one which
approximated most closely the ideal type of fascism, achieving a relative approximation between totalitarian Nazi ideology
and practice, characterised by the imposition of new institutional mechanisms to serve the dictatorial functions of the state.
See Guy Hermet, “La dynamique du Fascism” in Aux Frontieres de la Democratie, (Paris: Economica, 1983), pp.125-149.
15 Among the most influential arguments, one could mention the following: Eugen Weber’s Varieties of Fascism, (New
York: Van Nostrand, 1964); Juan Linz’s brilliant comparative study of fascism, in "Some notes towards a Comparative
Study" op.cit; Nicos Poulantzas’ neo-marxist approach on the “exceptional capitalist state” in Fa cism a d Dictatorship,
(Verso, 1974); Ian Kershaw’s extensive work on the Nazi regime in The Nazi Dictatorship, (London: Edward Arnold,
1985); George Mosse’s analysis on Nazi culture in Nazi Culture; Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich,
(New York: Schocken Books, 1981); Stanley Payne’s distinction between fascist and reactionary regimes in Fascism;
Comparison and Definition, (The University of Wisconsin Press, 1980); Griffin’s concept of “palingenetic ultra-
nationalism” in The Nature of Fascism, op.cit; Eatwell’s ideological approach in Fascism; A History, (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1995); and the recent debate on fascism in International Fascism; Theories, Causes and the New Consensus,
edited by Roger Griffin, (New York: Arnold, 1998)
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phenomenon".16 Its endurance through time is particularly relevant to the study of the extreme
right. Some scholars have endorsed the historical specificity and the essentially inter-war
character of fascism, a phenomenon which started in 1922-23 with the rise of Mussolini in
Italy, grew during the 1930s with the consolidation of the Nazi power in Germany and died
with the defeat of the Axis power in 1945.17 Other scholars maintain that fascism although
defeated during the Second World War, has managed to make its presence felt in post-war
democratic societies, either as ideology or as social and political behaviour and that it should
be regarded as the key reference in the examination of the political and ideological space for
the extreme right. 18 Roger Griffin, in his book The Nature of Fascism argues that as a
political ideology fascism has been and is still able to spawn new movements and thus should
be treated as permanent feature of modern political culture. He believes that the new radical
right wing phenomenon can be usefully understood as a product of fascism’s “chameleon-like
palingenetic ultra-nationalist ideology”19 t  a radically changed historical
climate:
As an ideology fascism did not die with Mussolini and Hitler. Pockets of ‘nostalgic’ and ‘mimetic’
fascism have persisted since 1945…..Moreover, new generations of fascists have appeared in every
westernised country to challenge consumerism, pluralism and hedonism either by imitating or
modifying versions of inter-war models or experimenting with completely new formulations of the
vision of national rebirth, some of which envisage a pan-European or even global movement of
regeneration. Thus palingenetic ultra-nationalism can be assumed to be a permanent ideological
structure among the many which together constitute Western socio-political structure. (p. 219)
The influence of the fascist phenomenon is also apparent in most journalistic accounts where
the term “fascist” is being used as a derogatory for many 20
th
 century authoritarian
dictatorships and leaderships all over the globe.  It is a r current habit in the press to view each
wave of extremist violence or the parliamentary rise of extreme right wing parties not only as a
serious threat to democracy, but as the revival of some form of fascism, as well.
It is true that contemporary extreme right in some cases seeks an inspiration from inter-war
fascist symbols or slogans aiming at disillusioned individuals and disenchanted social groups
who are oriented towards ultra-conservative and aggressive patriotic alternatives. But as Peter
Merkl puts it “the question has to be raised whether the eager self-identification with an old
and often poorly understood label –and under completely different circumstances- really
                                         
16 See Stanely G. Payne "Historical Fascism and the Radical Right" in Journal of Contemporary History V l 35 (1),
(London: Sage Publications, 2000), pp. 109-118.
17 H.R. Trevor Roper “ The Phenomenon of Fascism” in SJ Woolf (ed) European Fascism (New York:Vintage Books,
1969), pp. 18-38
18 See Piero Ignazi “The Extreme Right in Europe: A Survey” in Th  Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, op.
Cit.
19 Griffin’s widely acclaimed definition of fascism refers to “a genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various
permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism”. See The Nature of Fascism, op. cit.
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resurrects the old identities.”20 Unquestionably, the adoption of certain ideas and the use of
various symbols reminiscent of the inter-war years establish an impressionistic connection
between fascism and the present extreme right. It would be unrealistic to think that fascism
should be erased from Europe without leaving any negative legacies.21 But to ov restimate the
influence of fascism in the current era would lead to a totally erroneous conception of the
current radical right. The persistent comparison with the fascist context obfuscates the analysis
of the contemporary phenomenon, which is based on a radically different conjuncture of socio-
economic, political and international factors. As the paper sets out to argue, the shifts in the
international, social, economic, political and cultural climate have resulted into the emergence
of a new extreme right, manifested in new movements addressing different ideological and
political issues.
2. Socio-Economic Approach; Product of Post-Industrial Changes
It is widely held that people gravitate towards extreme right wing solutions in times of
economic recession and/or growing inequalities. Problems of unemployment, high inflation
rates, large-scale de-industrialisation and huge increases in rents have caused widespread
frustration and a climate for the growth of radical right manifestations, in post-war France,
Germany and Italy as well as most post-communist Eastern European countries. In fact,
during the last decade we have been witnessing the rise of extreme right parties in the East
German states, as well as a considerable number of extra-parliamentary violent activities. Even
though country, regional and branch-specific unemployment as well as wider economic
problems have unquestionably played a role in drawing some people towards the extreme
right, there does not seem to appear always and everywhere a direct correlation between
unemployment or other specific economic problems, on the one hand, and voting for radical
right parties, on the other.22 Austria stands out as an interesting case study of a prosperous
economy with low levels of unemployment and high electoral percentages of the extreme right
wing Freedom party. Similarly, the Swiss People’s Party won 22.6% of the 1999 vote in the
Federal Council to become the second largest party in the Lower House of Parliament. The
Swiss economy was not the cause of discontent given that unemployment in that year was
barely 2% and inflation just over 1%. The extent to which the radical right has fed directly off
the problems of recession and unemployment in the 1990s is also debatable in the cases of
Norway, or the prosperous state of Bavaria in Germany. Similarly, some regions that are
suffering from the effects of post-industrialisation are not necessarily experiencing a rise in
                                         
20 Peter H. Merkl “Why are they so strong now? Comparative reflections on the revival of the radical right in Europe” in
The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, op. cit., p 23.
21 See Larsen, “Overcoming the Past when Shaping the Future”,op. cit. p 1837.
22 Diethelm Prowe “Fascism, neo-fascism new radical right?” in International Fascism; Theories, Causes and the New
Consensus, op.cit., pp. 305-324.
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right radicalism. In Belgium, for instance, unemployment in Wallonia is consistently higher
than the rest of the country and the heavy industry and mining on which the region’s economy
once depended are in decline. However, it is in Flanders a region, which has done relatively
well that the extreme right has been flourishing.23 Furthermore, in countries with lower levels
of economic development, higher unemployment and more backward industries, like Greece,
Portugal and Spain, the extreme right wing parties have been achieving minimal gains in their
respective national elections.
Be that as it may, it is reasonable to expect that economic recession, unemployment and
personal insecurity may create a climate of social disaffection towards governmental policies
leading to the support of extremist forces. That was clearly the case with the rise of extremism
during the inter-war period although the international circumstances were radically different
form the present ones. So what are the current international circumstances, economic changes
and new social conflicts that could explain why radical movements have been so popular in the
1990s? Contemporary radical right in Europe has been rightly perceived (by those who have
managed to disentangle their analysis from fascism) in the context of advanced global capitalist
economies and the modernisation/transformation process from the industrial to the post-
industrial era. The exhaustion of the welfare state, deregulation, rapid technological changes,
the increasing growth of international trade, a general transformation of the labour markets
and more flexible employment policies have been the main features of the new transformed
international context. The rapid obsolescence of skills, a continuous pressure on the individual
to retrain and reskill, slow and modest gains in real wages and a minimal protection by a
reduced state have been some of the most critical social effects of this dramatic transformation
which has been increasingly felt in the last decade of the 20th century. These structural
changes have left a new unskilled, unemployed, undereducated and unsafe underclass,
potential supporter of right-wing radicalism.24 The lack of skill, unemployment and low levels
of education have, therefore, been used as explanatory variables for extreme right
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity indicating that the median supporter of radical
right wing tendencies in Europe tends to be a younger male with medium or low level of
education, working in a blue-collar job in the private sector or a young unemployed and living
in an urban environment.25
Given that there is no direct causality between recession/unemployment and extremism, it is
safer to claim that it is rather the fear of unemployment and social dislocation than the actual
experience that motivates support for the extreme right.26 The fear is linked with the
                                         
23 Patrick Hossay “Our people first! Understanding the Resonance of the Vlaams Blok’s Xenophobic Programme” in Soc al
Identities, Volume 2 Number 3 (1996), pp. 343-364.
24 See Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, (New York: St Martin's Press 1994).
25 Peter H. Merkl “Why are they so strong now?" op.cit., pp.26-27.
26 Stefan Immerfall, “The Neo-populist agenda” in The Politics of the New Right, op.cit, p.250.
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increasing pattern of immigration and multiculturalism in Europe. Immigration is a growing
trend for post-industrial societies because their wealth attracts an increasing number of
economic or political refugees from less fortunate regions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the
Middle East, as well as previous colonies of major European former international powers. The
current context of multiculturalism exacerbates fears and perceptions of waves of immigrants
that endanger domestic employment in advanced Europe although most post-industrial
societies have developed segmented labour sectors that native citizens usually no longer want
to enter.27 Immigration and multiculturalism have therefore become time and time again the
salient and controversial issues, and in conditions of economic hardships and personal unsafety
for the citizens, the refugees become the easy scapegoats for unemployment, crime, diseases,
urban degeneration and national decline.28 This has been a persistent trend in most of the
advanced European societies during the last two decades, which have witnessed the rise of
extreme right parties.
Overall, the context of post-industrialism, unemployment and immigration offers a valuable
macro-framework of the international socio-economic changes and their effects on the
domestic political mobilisation of extreme forces within the advanced European societies. It is
a necessary explanatory framework, which accounts for the existence of social dislocations
and frustrations brought about by such radical changes. It can offer a satisfactory explanation
why there is a propensity for the support of extreme political forces. But it cannot by itself
explain whether these social anxieties are actually directed towards the extreme right and not
towards other forms of mobilisation. It accounts for the resilience of extremism but cannot
adequately explain why parties of the radical right are going through periods of upsurge and
decline. Why is it successful in some national settings and unsuccessful or non-existent in
other? Furthermore, if one accepts the socio-economic thesis unequivocally, then one should
expect a further rise of extreme right parties, as the process of the post-industrial/technological
change is bound to continue and intensify in the future. Having said that, the structural analysis
is vital for the understanding of the phenomenon in that it helps to appreciate the general
context conducive to the rise of such forces. Economic recession, unemployment (or fear of
unemployment) and surges of immigration can act as catalysts that crystallise right wing
extremism on the level of party competition as long as political entrepreneurs can embed
xenophobic slogans in a broader discourse for which they find a receptive audience.29 What is
needed, therefore, at the next level is a political analysis of conditions and choices that give
rise to extremist political formations and radical forms of mobilisation.
                                         
27 Kitscelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, op.cit. p 258.
28 Paul Hainworth, “Introduction. The Cutting Egde: The Extreme Right in Post-War Western Europe and the USA” in The
Extreme Right in Europe and the USA, dited by Paul Hainworth (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), p.8.
29 Kitscelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, op.cit. p.3.
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3. Political Approach; Protest Politics
The contemporary radical right is the offspring of democratic politics; it thrives through
elections and democratic procedures and has grown within the politically stable environment
of post- Second World War Western European advanced democracies. It is important to stress
the stable democratic framework in order to understand that no matter how anti-system30,
authoritarian or anti-democratic those forces are, they chose to compete in the national and/or
European elections. Historically, the defeat of fascism led to the marginalisation of those
extreme right political forces, which were considered to be associated with the inter-war
fascist context. In the first decades following the end of the Second World War, the extreme
right operated at the fringe of mainstream politics with some presence in Italy or Germany,
both countries with a powerful fascist and nazi recent past. These parties acted mainly as
remnants of the fascist era holding direct organisational and ideological links with their
predecessors. In many ways the MSI (Movimiento Sociale Italiano) in Italy can be said to
represent a successful case of a post-war extreme right party with parliamentary representation
in the National and European Parliaments, links with other neo-fascist parties abroad and a
substantial number of members.31 Its West German counterpart the NPD (National
Democratic Party) achieved some electoral successes in many German states during the 1960s
but failed to overcome the 5% barrier in national elections and during the 1970s disintegrated
into smaller fractions.32
A drastic turn in the nature and significance of extreme right wing parties took place during
the 1980s and 1990s as a result of transformations of the international socio-economic
environment, and shifts in values, issues and life styles.33 Increasingly western democracies
                                         
30 An anti-system party is characterised, according to Sa tori, by an activity that undermines the legitimacy of democratic
regimes and a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates. See Giovanni
Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
31 The MSI during the post war period in Italy was relegated to a state of par leg lity because it refused to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the new republic- it was therefore found at once inside and outside the post-war party system. It was in a
way the keeper of the fascist torch mostly in a nostalgic mode, loyal to the fascism of the Republic of Salo. An array of
themes remained nearly identical for forty years including advocacy of the third way in between liberal capitalism and
social-communism, rejection of the party system, intransigeant anticommunism, appeals for a strong executive, support for
aggressive government intervention in the social sphere, opposition to the guiding role of superpowers in international
politics. Its national election results were around the 5%. Its members were mostly of the southern underclass and the rural
oligarchy and in the 1970s from the lower urban middle classes. See Roberto Chiarini "The 'M vimiento Sociale Italiano':
A Historical Profile" in Neo-Fascism in Europe, op.cit., pp. 19-42.
32 The NPD openly rejected the democratic values upon which the Federal Republic was based and was basically
composed by leftover parties from the Nazi era. Despite its electoral successes at the state level, the party failed to
surmount the 5% hurdle in the national elections and was doomed to a subsequent decline and the creation of splinter
parties. See David Childs, "The Far Right in Germany since 1945" in Neo-Fascism in Europe, op.cit., pp. 66-85.
33 Some analysts have attributed a change of attitudes and predispositions in the 1960s with the beginning of a fundamental
turn in Western politics and culture. The shift of political and social values has been connected with the events of 1968
and beyond when the first challenges to the established political order from the New Left emerged. The challenge of the
New Left with its agenda of egalitarianism, feminisn, multi-culturalism and enviromentalism changed the political
spectrum of western European party systems. At the other end of the new politics, the race and immigration issue became
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came under the heavy pressure of the radical right. Extreme right political formations
presented themselves as new forces and distanced themselves from the backward-looking,
reactionary politics of the traditional neo-fascist right.34 In that era of transformed extreme
right politics, the French Front National emerged as the characteristic expression of European
political extremism with an openly anti-immigration platform, sizeable electoral numbers and a
non-negligible role in the French political system. Other notable cases of the transformed
extreme right include the regionalist Vla ms Bloc in Belgium, the Freedom Party in Austria,
the Progress Parties in Norway and Denmark or the Allianza Nazionale and the Lega Nord in
Italy. In Germany the extreme right is more fragmented and its electoral successes are more
apparent in state elections.
But apart from by-products of the post industrial era, why are the parties of the contemporary
extreme right electorally gaining ground in the advanced western European democracies?
Most political approaches converge that the contemporary extreme right is a form of protest
politics, against a climate of corruption, scandals and patronage dominant in the 1990s western
European political culture. The rise and success of the radical right is seen within a context of
growing public pessimism, anxiety and disaffection. As the public’s confidence in the
established political parties has steadily eroded, a growing number of voters have chosen either
to turn their backs on politics or to use the ballot as a means of protest. The political thesis
therefore sees the radical right wing parties primarily as parties of discontent, which manage to
exploit voters’ dissatisfaction.35
Indeed, many European political elites and the parties they represent have been recently
accused of association with corruption, scandals and patronage. Scrutiny on matters of party
funding has proved that many politicians are involved in economic scandals. The governing
elites are accused of favouritism in the allocation of jobs and contracts. A prevalent perception
in most European societies is that politicians are too absorbed with their own advancement
and as a result they have either lost contact with their electorates or they have been unable to
adapt to the changing circumstances. In most European countries, opinion research shows that
there is disillusionment with politicians and less confidence in such political institutions as the
government, the civil service, the police and the judiciary.36 A trend of irregularities has
emerged across the 1990s Europe that are damaging the reputations of the continent’s political
                                                                                                                         
defining elements of the new extreme right which stands as a negation to the New Left agenda. See Michael Minkenberg,
“The New Right in France and Germany” in The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Ninenties, op.cit., pp. 65-90.
34 In January 1995, Giabfranco Fini leader of the Movimiento Sociale Italiano (MSI) officially proclaimed the party’s
dissolution as well as the abandonment of the ideological stances, symbols, gestures and salutes that had closely identified
it with the Mussolinian past. In the MSI’s place Fini announced the foundation of the Alleanza Nazionale a neoliberal
right-wing movement committed to the democratic process, centrist in orientation and opposed in its constitution to anti-
Semitism, xenophobia and racism. Nearly two-thirds of the party’s supporters approve of the capitalist system and hold
favourable views on the privatisation of state industries.
35 Betz, Radical Right Wing Populism in Western Europe, op.cit.,  p 41.
36 “Is democracy in trouble? Th  Economist, 20 July 99.
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leaderships.37 One of the most indicative European cases has been the German slush fund,
which involved directly the leadership of Helmut Kohl, a politician who until recently had been
widely acclaimed for his European vision and the success of German unification. Similarly,
Benito Craxi, the politician who played a key role in post war Italian politics was seriously
implicated in scandals and died discredited in Tunisia. Francoi  Mitterand, Willy Claes, Felipe
Gonzalez, Edith Cresson and Silvio Berlusconi in Western Europe are some of the most
prominent names involved in scandal accusations. It is therefore plain that the public has
become less forgiving of practices to which they might have turned a blind eye before, even
when these implicate major political figures of a considerable European calibre.
The perceived climate of disaffection and corruption offers the political opportunity for
extreme right parties to expand their particular strategies. Profiting from the voters’ distrust
and alienation, the extreme right emerges as the alternative force to fight corruption and
patronage. Popular resentment for a system of patronage within the Austrian political system
and society was one of the main factors that led to the growing electoral strength of the
Freedom Party in the Austrian national elections since 1986. The party has reacted angrily
against the bipolar coalition of the two major parties (SPO-OVP), which dominated Austrian
politics since 1966, developing a system of influence and favouritism in the allocation of jobs,
housing and government contracts. The success of the L gaNord in the early 1990s was also
directly associated with widespread disaffection with the established Italian political
institutions. The party held as its ideological banner its distrust vis a vis the Italian political
system and the Mafia corruption, in the southern and central parts of Italy. The Lega accused
the Italian state for being unable to respond to the new challenges of modernisation, to control
corrupt politicians and Mafia families, and chose to fight against a corrupt and underdeveloped
Italian South which was increasingly dependent on state funds and employment. Similarly,
disaffection has been an important feature of the French Front National’s political discourse
expressed in his infamous attacks against the “gang of four”. Political entrepreneurs across
Europe, like Haider, Bossi or Lepen, find the opportunity to promote themselves and their
parties as viable alternatives to a perceived corrupt political establishment, by using the tools
of political marketing to disseminate their ideas among the electorate.38
The extreme right is also benefiting from a political environment of crumbling parties and
volatile electorates that has developed over the past decade. This volatile political climate of
distrust and suspicion is also connected with the end of the traditionally perceived class
parties, which has resulted into the weakening of traditional voter loyalties and the decline of
party memberships. With the end of the cold war ideologies of capitalism vs communism and
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the predominance of the market oriented democratic discourse, the role of ideological parties
based on class criteria has diminished. Voters are more flexible in their electoral behaviour.
The political context of the post-industrial society of the eighties and nineties is no longer
driven by the class dynamics of the industrial revolution. This decline of cleavage politics
opens up new opportunities for new parties if they are able to monopolise a new issue and thus
find a niche in the new space of post-industrial politics. That brings us to our fourth variable,
the ideological component of the extreme right and its ability to mobilise individuals from
various or particular social strata on the basis of issues that can manipulate the worries and
resentments of individuals and social groups.
4. Ideological Approach; Xenophobic and Exclusionary Discourse
One of the defining characteristics of the extreme right phenomenon is its idiosyncratic
ideological character. The principal contradiction of the extreme right ideological discourse is
that while there is a common core of beliefs that clearly distinguishes this from the other
contemporary European political ideologies, at the same time, it is highly heterogeneous,
culturally specific and unique in every national setting. In the existing literature, the radical
right is either presented as the re-emergence of a fascist discourse or as a single-issue response
to immigration.
Based on the previous discussion on fascism, fascist ideology should be context alised within
the specifics of the inter-war period, in order to appreciate the all-embracing and totalitarian
character of a doctrine which claimed to provide a complete and universal theory of man and
society against the alternative ideologies of liberalism and communism and to derive therefrom
a programme of political action.39 Having been generated within a radically different socio-
economic and political climate, the ideology of the current extreme right lacks the all-
embracing character and rigour of fascist ideology. While the fascist experience has exerted
some marginal influence on the post-war extreme right, the current extreme right ideology has
relinquished the bulk of the traditional fascist legacy in exchange for a volatile, issues-oriented,
highly opportunistic and populist discourse.
All European extreme right-wing parties share the common ideological notions of ultra-
nationalism, xenophobia, hatred towards immigrants and virulent anti-communism. But having
been bred in conditions of democracy, the extreme right has accepted the rules of the liberal
system. It is in the rejection of the cultural pluralism of the liberal political system, the reaction
to the system’s tolerance towards national minorities and the adoption of an exclusionary
perception of citizenship, where lies the ideological essence of right wing extremism. This is
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translated in most cases into open racism directed against foreigners and immigrants, and in
some cases homosexuals, women or religious groups. There is, therefore, a hostility towards
the “other and the different” which in cases of subversive, extra-parliamentary groups leads
into actions of hate, destruction and crime.
The deepest hostility is reserved for immigrants and refugees who are considered responsible
for unemployment and crime in societies where they now live. They are perceived to threaten
family values and the national education in schools, and to be the cause of economic
insecurity. The emergence of racism as a phenomenon of the 20th century has been attributed
to modernisation, social and political change. However, there is a clear distinction between
genetically-based racist arguments, professed at earlier times and the kind of the contemporary
cultural neo-racism, which does not call for a racially pure society but for a return of the
masses of non-European foreigners to their country of origin.40
Having said that, the extreme right should not be perceived as a single-issue ideological
phenomenon. In fact no party or movement can thrive solely on racist beliefs and if it chooses
to concentrate on such themes, it is either doomed to remain at the fringe of mainstream
politics and/or adopt a more aggressive and anti-system form of mobilisation. It is misleading
to focus exclusively on racism, xenophobia and ultra-nationalism, especially as such views
have been long pervasive in European culture.41 It is however, important not to lose sight of
the principles of exclusion and intolerance which constitute the essence of a common
ideological core of the European extreme right, and a more aggressive verbalism that is
evident in most parties, groups and movements of that political family.
Further to a fanatical exclusionary discourse, contemporary right-wing extremism is an
ideological force which is addressing wider political and economic issues, as well as the
present-day concerns of many citizens.42 In political matters, it professes hostility and aversion
towards the political class. In economic matters, the majority of western European radical
right parties support free market economics and the capitalist system. However, economic
nationalism may be espoused, which is directed against international bankers, currency traders,
transnational corporations or the Brussels bureaucracy. European integration is a less clear
issue and other parties may denounce EU membership altogether, other oppose deeper
integration and other object to the eastern enlargement of the EU. In terms of every day
citizens’ issues, extreme right parties have espoused positions on the ecology, transport,
housing, lower taxes, drugs and the death penalty. In terms of cultural values, the extreme
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right usually refers to a moral kind of traditionalism, the preservation of the family nucleus, the
inferior role of women, and the negative stance towards abortion or homosexuality. Not all the
parties of the extreme right, however, adopt similar ultra-traditional values. The Freedom
Party in Austria, for instance, favours a liberal position on women and supports the right for
abortion.43 The Vlaams Bloc, on the other hand, supports a more conservative and
traditionalist worldview on law and order, maintaining the adoption of anti-abortion and anti-
homosexual measures, while it has even attacked the Austrian Freedom Party’s liberalism. All
in all, the belief system of right-wing extremism can be perceived as a catchall ideological
discourse, which lends themes from a variety of issues, in order to address as wider an
audience as possible, bearing different national expressions. The more committed these parties
appear to the democratic process, the safer they become in the eyes of the electorates.
In sum, based on the complementary and comparative approach of the above mentioned four
theses, the contemporary extreme right should be studied in the light of the following defining
dimensions:
(1) Historically, its connection with fascism is mostly impressionistic. Fascism is a specific
phenomenon of regimes and movements comprising ideologies, personalities, policies,
structures and a style all peculiar to it, all of which operated and interacted during the
particular context of the inter-war period. On the contrary, the contemporary extreme right is
the outcome of a new environment, in the form of new parties and movements with updated
ideas.
(2) Socio-economically, recession, unemployment and personal insecurity within the context
of multi-cultural societies can act as catalysts for social distress directed towards extremism.
But there is no straightforward causal relationship between recession, unemployment and
multiculturalism, on the one hand, and support for extreme right forces, on the other.
(3) Politically, extreme forces are reinforced within a context of distrust against the political
class but they are also developing within the context of democratic party-politics by whose
rules they are forced to abide in order to escape their peripheral existence.
(4) Ideologically, as a European core belief system, the extreme right is xenophobic and
exclusionary. At the same time it is heterogeneous, changeable and nationally specific
embracing a catchall ideological discourse.
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B. The Need for a Comprehensive Analysis on Eastern Europe
The study of the European extreme right is based almost exclusively on the Western European
experience. The continuity of extreme right forces in post-war Western Europe has enabled
scholars to draw some systematic analyses on the rise, persistence and nature of the forces of
extremism in the advanced capitalist democracies. The fall of communism, apart from all the
other well-known radical changes, has also unleashed extremist, exclusionary and intolerant
ultra-nationalistic forces in the countries of Eastern Europe. Due to the short time span of
post-communist democracy, the context of extremism in Eastern Europe is a topic which
needs more systematic and comparative examination. In the study of Eastern European
politics, the questions of why extremist nationalist forces exist in Eastern Europe are
effectively downplayed. Most analyses have concentrated on Balkan extremism, which is, after
all, seen as an inherent feature of the region’s political culture. Furthermore, there is a
tendency to consider those who hold ultra-nationalistic attitudes "as backward in their thinking
as well as dangerous, ill-intentioned or blind concerning the practical consequences of their
thinking".44 While this is to a certain extent true, the wider circumstances that breed
extremism in Eastern Europe as well as their implications are not sufficiently accounted for
either by scholars or by policy makers. Bearing this in mind, I will proceed by asking the same
questions for Eastern Europe -already asked for Western Europe- in order to assess the
conditions for extremism in that part of Europe, as well. Are current extreme forces, a
reappearance of the inter-war fascist period in Eastern Europe? How does the structural socio-
economic international context affect domestic changes in Eastern European societies? Is there
a similar political climate of distrust and suspicion against the political class? What is the
nature of the Eastern European extremist ideological discourse? I will be, therefore,
attempting to apply the previous eclectic analysis in the Eastern European region, in order to
suggest some comparative notions between the two regions.
1. The Historical Dimension; A Double Authoritarian Legacy
It has been repeatedly argued that there is a direct connection between current ultra-
nationalistic parties in Eastern Europe and the inter-war fascist era. This is seen as the result of
communist suppression of all nationalistic tendencies, that in the post-communist democratic
context found a political and ideological space to express themselves openly most of them
seeking inspiration from the inter-war era. It is also well documented that all Eastern
European countries developed strong fascist movements and regimes during the inter-war
period, as circumstances in the region provided a fertile ground for the emergence of such
forces. Following the end of the First World War, the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian
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Empire, the subsequent unclear nature of borders, the existence of minorities scattered around
various newly formed states and the creation of irrede tist aspirations, the wider international
socio-economic crisis and the predominant influence of the German factor in Eastern Europe,
led to the appearance and legitimisation of ultra-nationalistic and fascistic extreme forces in the
region. During the 1930s almost all the countries in Eastern Europe sought authoritarian and
quasi-fascist solutions to deal with their social, economic, political and international pressures
and tensions created by the unstable climate at the time.45 Regimes and movements, one after
the other, started to emulate ideas, symbols, policies and mobili ational aspects from the
dominant and influential Italian and German regimes. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's Iron Guard
and the regime of Antonescu in Romania, Ferenc Szalasi's Arrow Cross and the Horthy
government in Hungary, Josef Tito the leader of the Slovak Nazi puppet regime during the
WWII, Pisudski’s dictatorship in Poland, the Ustasa party in Croatia have all been associated
in one way or another with the dominant fascist experience.
In Eastern -as in Western- Europe, an overemphasis on the legacy of fascism can obfuscate the
importance of the current socio-economic, political and ideological context, which is radically
different from the inter-war Eastern European context. Undoubtedly, the legacy of fascism on
the current extreme right is more pronounced in Eastern Europe, as nationalistic forces had
been completely suppressed under the period of communist rule and re-emerged in the post-
communist democratic context. Also, the appearance of leaders and parties, recultivating an
inter-war political style and ideology, reinforces the impression that there is a direct
correlation between the extreme nationalism of the present and that of inter-war period.
However, what remains relatively unexplored is the nationalistic and authoritarian legacy of
communism, as a point of rupture or continuation with the extreme and the other nationalistic
forces of the inter-war period. Communism did initially suppress and contain the nationalistic
and fascistic tendencies, as a result of its military victory over fascism, its fundamental
ideological opposition with the fascist discourse and the officially held belief of
internationalism over nationalism. However, in practice many communist elites favoured a
model of national communism strongly influenced by ethnic stereotypes and nationalist
demagogy, as a way to secure legitimacy and escape the totality of Soviet domination. There
has been a blend between nationalist and communist forces in many countries and in various
ways: members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross became militant communists, Ceausesku
sought political legitimacy and power through the adoption of a Romanian ultra-nationalism,
while national communism became eventually a norm in Tito’s Yugoslavia. As George
Schopflin argues "after the end of mon lithism, existing national majorities would be given
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something of a framework within which they could find some satisfaction for their
aspirations…..This process was intensified as the communist regimes began to exhaust their
enfeebled legitimacy and they turned more and more towards trying to rely on nationalism".46
Moreover, national and sub-national differences between the countries of Eastern Europe
remained visible in terms of levels of prosperity adopted economic policies and degrees of
allowed opposition. Nationalism was, therefore, officially muted and/or freezed by the
communist regimes but never obliterated.
In that way, there is a double legacy of fascist and communist authoritarianism /totalitarianism,
which greatly influences the nature of extremism in the societies of Eastern Europe, the
endurance of certain mentalities and perceptions. However, most importantly, the rise of right
extremism in the 1990s is related to the end of the Cold War and the appearance of a radically
different international socio-economic, political and ideological conjuncture i.e. economic
globalisation the establishment of a democratic/parliamentary system and the predominance of
western ideas and values.
2. The Socio-economic Dimension; Imported Capitalism
Following the abrupt end of the communist dictatorships, the countries of Eastern Europe
were required to adopt a western model of liberal capitalism, which is foreign to their recent
economic philosophy and tradition. This type of radical economic reform has been conditioned
by global changes in markets and competition, new international divisions of labour and
technology shifts in production. Interpreting socio-economic transition in Eastern Europe is a
question of locating the region within the broader framework of globalisation and the context
of European integration and the effects these changes bear upon their societies. All the
countries of Eastern Europe have been asked by the European Union and the international
financial institutions to introduce and adopt rapid reforms aiming at macroeconomic
stabilisation, market liberalisation, privatisation, developments of market support institutions,
currency convertibility and trade liberalisation.47
These types of reform require the introduction of radically different economic rules of the
game, which go against a long held statist overprotective tradition based upon centralised
planning in which production, distribution and exchange were under state ownership and
control. This radical transformation brought significant losses not only to previously dominant
political and economic interests but also to other social groups of the populations. More
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important, these countries are forced to adopt an advanced type of liberal capitalism without
ever having tried any earlier versions of that model.
Some analysts have gone as far as to suggest that the new international economic environment
has only benefitted the advanced countries of the West and has been working at the expense of
all the developing and under-dev lopped countries. Eastern Europe is clearly included in the
category of countries that have been suffering the costs of the new international economic
order. It is even being argued that globalisation processes ma ginalise these countries. The
Balkan region is a case in point where countries are in a chronic state of political crisis,
institutional weakness, social and nationalist upheaval. Such processes have given rise to
radical nationalism and the so-called ethnic cleansing generating frequent analogies with
totalitarian nazi Germany and the Holocaust experience.48
Despite a general Eastern European trend towards uncertainty as a result of the current post-
communist transition, success varies from country to country in the way they embrace the neo-
liberal model, with the countries of Central Europe showing better sings of adjustment than
the cases of Southeastern Europe. However, even the most advanced economically cases, like
Poland or the Czech Republic, have to endure the shock effects of such a radical process, as it
is clear that the path towards liberal capitalism is not a unil near trajectory but entails ups and
downs. The transition to the market economy may therefore imply growing unemployment,
widening social and economic inequalities, inflationary pressures and a high degree of personal
risk and insecurity. Such effects can be a cause of discontent and frustration for many
individuals and social groups. In this transitional context, nationalistic choices that profess an
introvert, anti-market and xenophobic philosophy can be legitimised as viable alternatives in
periods of economic problems and downturns.
3. The Political Dimension; Reaction to Democratic Politics
The countries of Eastern Europe are either in the process of consolidation (Central Europe) or
transition/reconstruction (S utheastern Europe) of their democratic systems, which means that
in all the countries the process of democratisation can be reversible.49 As lectoral systems and
party structures have been adopted from the very early stages of transition, electoral coalitions
and intra-elite choices and strategies have constituted the essence of political processes in the
countries of Eastern Europe. One of the main elements of the Eastern European party system
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is the high level of party fractionalisation.50 This is the outcome of the simultaneous post-
communist transition at the economic, political and cultural levels, and the variety of
economic, national, ethnic, cultural and political dimensions that have been addressed.
Questions of national identity, cultural expression, economic practice and political reform are
all part of the current transition/consolidation process. The uncertainty of the socio-economic
interests, the fragmentation and weak institutionalisation of the party system and the variety of
issues to be solved produce new opportunities for aspiring political actors.51
As in Western Europe, a similar distrust towards politicians and allegations for corruption
scandals has been observed in countries like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. In fact
corruption is apparent (with varying degrees) in all the countries of Eastern Europe with
significant political and economic repercussions. At the economic level, it is associated with
privatisation and liberalisation processes and the control of the main assets in the hands of the
few, "the political friends". Financial corruption has become particularly prevalent in the post
communist systems, and includes organised fraud, illegal cross-border trafficking, bribery of
public officials or money laundering. In the countries of Southeastern Europe, particularly, the
informal sector has acquired a predominant position in the overall political economy of the
region. At the political level, it is associated with corrupt political elites and corrupt
administrative systems. Political power is exercised outside recognised political institutions
and the rule of law, in a context of clientelism and favouritism. In Eastern Europe, with non-
consolidated democratic procedures corruption breeds disillusionment which may be directed
against democratic regimes. Mistrust for politics can therefore go beyond the normal
scepticism towards the political class in Western democracies.
One trend in the politics of the region has been the emergence of parties and movements
espousing ultra-nationalist positions, authoritarian and populist tendencies. The most
representative cases have included the Serbian Radical Party under Seselj, the Republicans of
Miroslav in the Czech Republic, the Confederation for an Independent Poland, the Romanian
National Unity Party (PUNR), the Slovak National Party and the Justice and Life Party of
Istvan Csurka. These parties have been able, to a greater or lesser degree, to influence the
political agendas and orientations of mainstream parties and/or governments towards more
extreme and ultra-nationalistic positions. The fragmented character of the Eastern European
party system is also reflected in the composition of the extreme right political family
comprising a large number of parties, groups and movements. In Poland there are extreme
right parties of a traditionalist-clerical character (Christian National Union), of a populist
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character (KPN, Patria X) or of an openly racist orientation (Polish National Commonwealth-
Polish National Party and Polish National Front sharing links with extremist extra-
parliamentary groups).52 In Slovakia, a large number of extreme right organisations and
movements comprises groups created after the Velvet Revolution to defend the legacy of Josef
Tito and his wartime Slovak state, skinhead movements, and the more influential Slovak
National Party which has participated as a coalition partner in the governments of Prime
Minister Meciar.53  In Romania where the extreme right has had a significant presence in
relation to the other Eastern European countries, there are extreme parties of an Orthodox
Christian orientation with direct references to the fascist era (National Union for Christian
Revival)54 or of a radical nationalist orientation, (Romania National Unity and the Greater
Romania Party both linked to the former Securitate).55
Anti-democratic nationalistic and extreme forces are by no means the dominant forces in the
East. Yet there is a potential influence of xtremisms of Right and Left, who united in their
opposition to democratisation and market economic reform, they may occasionally tither the
delicate balance of democratic transition and consolidation. Their ideological influence may be
more influential converging in some respects with beliefs, attitudes and mentalities held by
larger sections of the populations and the mainstream parties in those countries.
4. The Ideological Dimension; the Ethnic Nature of Xenophobia
The foremost ideological characteristic of the extreme right in Eastern Europe is its
chauvinistic ultra-nationalistic orientation. While Eastern European radical right nationalism is
equally xenophobic and verbally aggressive as its Western European counterpart, it can be also
ethnically intolerant, irredentist, anti-Semite and fearful of external/foreign domination.
Eastern European extreme right professes the ethnic intolerance towards the other ethnic
minorities. Sabrina Ramet supports that it is "intolerance", which distinguishes the radical right
from the moderate right, that is "the refusal to allow that alternative ideas have a right to
exist".56 However, while ethnic intolerance is a necessary defining characteristic of the Eastern
European extreme right, it is not the sole the property of the extreme right in Eastern Europe
and can be shared by other political groups which do not belong to the extreme right family.
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Political formations in former Yugoslavia have repeatedly espoused ideas of ethnic intolerance
leading their countries to destructive wars. In many other cases, the politics of identity have
resulted in deliberate governmental policies to exclude the ethnic minorities from power as in
Latvia and Estonia with the rights of the Russian minorities, or in Romania with the rights of
the Hungarian minority.57 Furthermore, in all Eastern European countries, attitudes towards
the Roma minorities surpass the ideological territory of the strictly defined extreme right.
What this shows is that ethnic intolerance is embedded to a greater or a lesser degree in the
political and cultural discourse in Eastern European countries, offering the extreme right
parties and groups a fertile ideological ground for infiltration. What distinguishes however, the
ideology of the extreme right is an aggressive verbalism regarding the inferior status of the
other ethnic populations. Most Eastern European citizens consider the Roma as uncivilised
and instigators of crime, but the extreme rightist openly declares them as “pollutant” and “a
threat to the national existence" of their respective populations.
Anti-Semitism is another expression of ethnic intolerance and a prevalent feature of the
Eastern European extreme right discourse. In Eastern Europe, the numbers of Jews today
cannot justify and reactivate the anti-Semitic feelings of previous periods, as the numbers of
Jews are limited to a few thousands in most European countries. Current anti-Semitism has
less to do with actual Jews than with the abstract image of “the Jew”, generating the
interesting phenomenon of anti-Semitism without Jews. The Jew represents the international
over the national, the imported and foreign over the domestic, the control over national
economies. Anti-Semitism is, therefore, based on a conspiracy theory, or rather clichés about
international Jewish conspiracies and plots of world domination, it is quite resilient and is not
confined solely in the mentalities of extremists, in the form of widespread negative stereotypes
about the influence and affluence of the international Jewry. In Western Europe, on the other
hand, anti-Semitism is mostly confined to a historical revisionism and the re-evaluation of
historical events, particularly concentrating on the actual existence and significance of the
holocaust.58
Extreme right nationalism is also directed against the role of the "international factor", a
predominant element that has defined developments in the region. All Eastern European
societies have been, in one way or the other, exposed either to direct foreign domination
(Ottoman and Habsburg rule, Nazi occupation) or indirect rule (Soviet domination). Even, the
                                         
57 Such governmental discriminations have tended to diminish due in large part to the close scrutiny of relevant
international organisations and the EU strict criteria for closer integration.
58 There are arguments of Holocaust denial claiming that the Holocaust was a myth fabricated in order to elicit support for
the state of Israel and other of historical revisionism, used abundantly by nationalist and extreme right-wing forces in order
to exonerate leaders and movements responsible for the Axis-allied states' genoci al policies. See Paul Hockenos, Free to
Hate; The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 271-299 and Roger
Eatwell, “The Holocaust Denial: A Study in Propaganda Technique” in Neo-Fascism in Europe, edited by Luciano Celes et
al (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 120-146.
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collapse of communism has been instigated from abroad. Similarly, the post-communist
situation is largely seen as the outcome of Western dominant influences, which prescribe the
nature of the current domestic political and economic trajectory.59 And while there is a wider
consensus as to the benefits of the current situation, there is still an underlying assumption that
political and economic recipes are imposed from abroad. Such a perception is easily exploited
by the extreme right wingers, as a way of resistance towards the influence of Western
international forces. The extreme right looks with suspicion any foreign participation in the
economy that could harm the security of the state. Most of them share a strong anti-German
sentiment, more pronounced in the cases of the Polish and the Czech extreme right. They are
totally sceptical of all supra-national organisations and especially EU integration and they
reject foreign participation or investment in their respective economies. Eastern Europeans
ultra-nationalists who glorify their state and its institutions may view the infiltration of foreign
structures or reform based on foreign strategies as a denigration of their institutional and
cultural framework and are likely to reject democracy in the interest of preserving traditional
more authoritarian political structures.60
Due to the statist tradition of the inter-war and the post-war periods the extreme right in post-
communist Europe has a statist character, favouring a considerable state role in the economy
and the distribution of resources. Despite a virulent anticommunist orientation, Eastern
European extreme right may paradoxically share some statist views with the unreformed
communists. Both the extreme right and left have rejected the liberal system of governance
and have been very suspicious of the market forces. There are significant numbers of ultra-
nationalists and unreconstructed communists who harbour hostile feelings towards
internationalist strategies against the imported models of market economy. This makes the
distinction between left and right much less clear and definitely not as straightforward as in
Western Europe, although here too there are some countries where voters of the extreme left
may opt for the parties of the extreme right.
Due to the authoritarian tradition, Eastern European extreme right espouses more openly and
effortlessly the rejection of pluralism and democratic institutions with a propensity towards
authoritarian ways of rule. All too often there is a glorification of the pre-communist past as
for example in Poland for the authoritarian P lsudski regime, in Hungary for the Horthy
government and the Arrow Cross and in Romania for Antonescu. As urel Braun suggests:
Even in the more stable states such as Poland and Hungary, this is dangerous romanticising of a
repressive past that can inhibit the development of a democratic political culture, encourage the worst
                                         
59 See Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price "D mocratization in Eastern Europe; The External Dimension" in Dem cratization in
Eastern Europe; Domestic and International Perspectives, edited by Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, (London:
Routledge, 1994), pp. 220-252.
60 Pamela Waldron-Moore, "Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition" in Comparative Political Studies,
Vol 32, No1 (February 1999) pp. 36-62.
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antidemocratic instincts of the population and make people more vulnerable again to the preachings of
demagogues who are so readily willing to take advantage of any political, economic and social crisis
61
While Eastern Europe shares a seemingly common political and economic trajectory there are
also striking national differences based on prior histories and cultures, levels of economic
development and degrees of democratic consolidation.62 The m st updated analyses and data
on Eastern Europe divides the region into two relatively homogeneous geographical
groupings: the advanced Central European region composed by Czech Republic, Poland,
Hungary, Slovenia as a cluster of more stable and promising market economies and essentially
more consolidated democratic systems; the more problematic South astern region with
numerous problems and difficulties in the transition process with crucial differences among the
countries of the two regions themselves. Irrespective of different levels of economic and
political development, all eastern countries have a range of ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic
forces that oppose the establishment of liberal democracy in their countries. Overall, the
extreme right is mostly a marginal force within Eastern European societies, in view of the
wider consensus on the currently adopted socio-economic, political and ideological post-
communist orientation. The vote for the extreme right has been ranging between 4 to 16
percent depending upon country. 63 Yet, such organised extreme alternatives have the
potential to penetrate the prevailing mainstream Eastern European mentality.
C. Comparative Points; Western vs Eastern Europe
While the causes and circumstances -socio-economic and political- that strengthen extreme
right forces are common across Europe, any analysis of the phenomenon is bound to be
nationally specific, closely linked with the particular national culture, mentalities and
perceptions of each nation state. The ultra-nationalistic core of their ideological discourse has
prevented this political family from becoming an organised international movement with a
transnational belief system and organisational structure. Cultural circumstances and national
conditions influence the attitudes and belief systems of right-wing ext emisms and there is no
uniform pattern in either across countries or across variables. There is a fundamental
incompatibility between nationalism in its far right version and the attempt to create
transnational alliances. Extremism varies from country to country and depends on the
                                         
61 See Aurel Braun, “The Incomplete Revolutions: The Rise of Extremist in East-Central Europe and the Formet Soviet
Union” in The Extreme Right; Freedom and Security at Risk, Braun & Scheinberg (eds), Westview Press, p.152.
62 Anna Seleny, Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland”
in World Politics 51.4 (1999) pp. 484-519.
63 Christopher Williams, "The Rise of the Radical Right" in The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989,
op.cit., pp. 29-48. For a comparative electoral average between interwar fascist and 1980s-1990s extreme right vote in
Western and Eastern Europe see Leonard Weinberg, “Conclusions” in The Revival of Right Wing Extremism in the
Nineties op.cit.,  pp 274-276.
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historical experiences, the political system, the economic development, the ethnic composition
and the perception of external enemies. The recognition of an enormous diversity in Europe is,
therefore, essential for the understanding of the particularities of the extreme right.
Having said that, the above analysis has attempted to highlight the regional character of the
current extreme right in the post cold war context by discussing the fundamental dimensions of
the current phenomenon and by juxtaposing the Western European model versus the Eastern
European experience. Indeed there are some differences between the two regions as a result of
different historical, socio-economic, political and ideological trajectories. The understanding of
the differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe is essential when trying to
apply the right strategy and resolve the problems in causes.
Historically, the fascist experience has been significant in both Western and Eastern Europe
during the inter-war period with the emergence of influential fascist or fascistoid regimes,
parties and movements in almost all the countries of Europe. However, the legacy of facism
should not be exaggerated. In Western Europe, the connection with the current extreme right
is mostly symbolic and impressionistic. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, references with
the inter-war context are more direct, as a result of the post-communist reappearance of
movements and parties, which had been suppressed during the communist period. The
democratic nature of post-war politics in Western Europe has significantly affected the
attitudes, goals and organisation of the extreme right. On the contrary, communist
totalitarianism has left the countries of Eastern Europe with a double (inter- and post-war)
authoritarian legacy and no experience of democracy.
Socio-economically, the extreme right is seen as the by-product of post-industrial capitalism
and multiculturalism. Both trends are common in Western and Eastern Europe. In Western
Europe, the transition to the current stage of capitalism has been much smoother than in
Eastern Europe as the system is deeply embedded in the development of the West and, in any
case, most post-industrial changes can be said to be generated in Western societies. In Eastern
Europe, on the other hand, with no previous experience of capitalism at all, post-industrial
capitalism has been an import of the West. Furtermore, the multicultural context is different in
those two parts of Europe. In Western societies it is the outcome of waves of immigration
from Third World during the post-war period as well as Eastern Europe after the collapse of
communism. In Eastern Europe, multiculturalism is mostly associated with the existence of a
multi-ethnic context, the product of an on-going long historical process. The negative effects
of post-industrial capitalism and multiculturalism ie. ecession, unemployment and personal
insecurity, can act as catalysts for social distress in both parts of Europe. But there is no
straightforward correlation between them and the rise of the extreme right forces in Western
Europe. In Eastern Europe, on the other hand, the precarious nature of the current socio-
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economic transition means that unemployment and economic recession can be more directly
associated with authoritarian and extremist alternatives.
Politically, democracy is common in both parts of Europe. In Western Europe it is a
consolidated system and the extreme right reaction -as protest politics- is directed against the
political class and its activities, but not against democratic principles per se. In Eastern
Europe, on the other hand, with a fluid and transitional democratic framework, extreme right
protest politics may undermine fundamental democratic principles. Furthermore, in Western
Europe, the political parties of the extreme right have undergone a radical transformation
during the 1980s, in terms of practices, beliefs and attitudes. In Eastern Europe, extreme
parties are a novel feature of the 1990s post communist politics. Similarly, the nature of
extreme right party politics is more consolidated in West rn Europe while in Eastern Europe it
is more blurred and fractionalised. Finally, in the West the extreme right is politically closer to
the traditional right, while in the East the extreme right may have common themes with some
of the unrepentant orthodox communists (although one could argue that after the end of the
cold war, the ideological boundaries between right and left have become more obscure in the
whole of Europe).
Ideologically, extremism generates a climate of xenophobia, it operates within a perceived
conspiratorial context and frequently adopts m nichaistic conceptions of the man and society.
Extremism breeds a fanatical, racist and exclusionary discourse, which is heterogeneous,
changeable and nationally specific. But there is absolutely no connection with the fascist and
totalitarian discourse of the inter-war period, which appeared much more holistic and
rigorous. Current extremist discourse is an amalgam of themes and topics of an opportunistic
and populist nature. The difference is that Western European extreme right ideology generates
a climate of xenophobia and racism against mutlicul uralism and immigration while Eastern
European extreme right breeds a climate of ethnic intolerance. In Eastern Europe there is a
prevalent conception of the nation where citizenship is defined in narrow ethnic terms and
ethnic nationalism has come to form the ideological justification for a more violent and
exclusionary approach towards other nationalities and ethnic groups. Reaction to international
interference is also pronounced in the Eastern European extreme right discourse. Overall, as a
system of beliefs the European contemporary extreme right lacks a cohesive and powerful
ideological framework, opting instead for a volatile and highly opportunistic fanatical and
exclusionary ideological discourse. Such notions are rather a set of disparate mentalities64,
                                         
64 The subject of mentalities, as an important determinant of social and political behaviour has been scarcely examined by
analysts, due to the difficulty of carrying out an empirical analysis of it. Yet, it can be a concept useful in many discussions
of the way elites and anonymous masses perceive their social environment. Mentalities are ways of thinking and feeling
more emotional than rational and they can be easily adapted in response to information and interpretative models that
dominate the public discourse. Ideologies, on the other hand, are more consistent, elaborated and refined systems of
thought which are not easily modified through time and space. See Juan Linz “Totalit rian and Authoritarian Regimes”, in
F. I. Greenstein and .W. Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory, Vol 3, (Massachusets
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which may, at times, have an impact on wider audiences. Relevant studies have shown that
most European countries display increased intolerance towards other races and foreign
workers and an increase in national pride, offering a fertile ground for exclusionary and
extreme alternatives. 65
Comparative variables: Western & Eastern Europe
Defining dimensions Western Europe Eastern Europe
Historical legacy  Inter-war fascist and
post-war democratic
frameworks.
Double authoritarian legacy of
inter-war fascism and post-war
communism.
Socio-Economic
environment
Post-industrial capitalism
& multi-cultural societies.
Imported capitalism &
multi-ethnic societies.
Political Context Established democratic
context;
Reaction to the political
establishment.
Transitional democratic context;
Reaction to democratic politics.
Ideologico-cultural Predominance of anti-
immigration platform with
some liberal tendencies
Anti-ethnic platform with
authoritarian tendencies;
Strong reaction to foreign
Interference.
D. A Piecemeal Strategic Analysis
Mainstream European democratic elites tend to perceive the nature of the extreme right on the
basis of two prevailing assumptions:
First, that democracy, market economy and European integration will undoubtedly lead to
economic prosperity and political stability and the m rginalisation of the forces of the radical
right. (Deterministic and unilinear character of European development)
Second, that those who hold extremist ultra-nationalistic attitudes are marginal and backward
and they are therefore doomed to fail. (Demonisation of the extreme right)
                                                                                                                         
Addison-Wesley, 1975) p 267.
65 Lauri Karvonen, “The New Extreme Right-Wingers in Western Europe: Attitudes, World Views and Social
Characteristics” in The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties, op.cit., pp. 91-110.
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The Austrian experience has left the European elites bewildered with the actual influence of an
extreme right party in a prosperous and stable European country. It goes against both
prevailing assumptions and indicates the ability of the extreme right to infiltrate mainstream
politics. The Austrian experience has revealed two shortcomings:
First, the inability of policy makers to appreciate the factors that can lead to the rise of
extreme right forces and the nature of this particular political family.
Second, the lack of a consistent and unanimous course of action towards such forces.
In principle, the logic of democracy is in lusionary and consensual with respect to all political
forces and ideological alternatives. In reality, democracy is faced with major dilemmas when
dealing with such forces of extremism. National democratic elites h ve adopted two strategies
towards the extreme right in Europe: to incorporate (inclusionary approach) and to isolate
(exclusionary approach). The inclusive school of thought argues that the extremists should be
enticed into mainstream politics in the hope that the process of political compromise will strip
them of their appeal or will render them harmless. The inclu ionary policy was pursued in Italy
when the Allianza Nazionale, was offered five cabinet posts in the government of Silvio
Berlusconi, in the mid-1990s. Currently, the AllianzaNazionale has 132 out of 945 MPs
making it the second largest opposition party. Furthermore, Forza Italia is in alliance with both
Allianza Nazionale and the Northern League making it impossible to form a government
without their votes. A similar inclusionary tactic was adopted by Schussel in Austria resulting
in the equal participation of the Freedom Party in the 2000 coalition government in Austria.66
The exclusionary school of thought opposes any deal with the far right arguing that such
parties have their roots in "Europe's blood-soaked past". The exclusionary policy was actually
adopted by President Chirac in March 1998, when despite the success of the National Front in
the French regional elections (the Front National held the balance of power in a majority of
France’s 22 regions), he opposed joining forces with the Front. The official parties of the
Right in France have denounced the FN unequivocally.67 Similarly, in Germany a rigorous
policy of treating extreme right parties with maximum disapproval may be part of the reason
why the three main far right parties account only for 2 or 3% of the total national vote. Having
said that, the fragmentation of the German nazi right prevents it from becoming an
accountable political force while recent studies argue that the far right in Germany has the
potential to rise to 13% in the national polls.68 A combination of the inclusionary and
exclusionary strategy is followed in the Southern European states where although the extreme
                                         
66 In the elections of October 1999, the SPO received 33.15% of the vote and 65 seats, the OVP and FPO received 26.91%
and 52 seats each.
67 In 1999 the Front National suffered a disastrous split with Bruno Megret forming the breakaway National Movement
and support for both started to decline from its previous 15%.
68 In an opinion poll published recently 32% of Germans said that they could imagine voting for a German version of
Haider and 36% fully agree with Haider’s policies. The Times 18.2.2000 and Daily Telegraph 17.2.2000.
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and authoritarian forces are openly discredited, representatives from extreme tendencies have
been incorporated into the parties of the right.
The European Union claims to be based on the “principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” (article 6 of the Treaty of the
European Union). Based on this legal/political justification, the EU countries reacted
unanimously with respect to the sanctions against the OVP-FPO Austrian government.
Proponents of the sanctions have heralded them as a milestone in the development of the EU
as a community of political and moral values, a step beyond economic and monetary
integration. Critics view them as an unprecedented intervention in the domestic affairs of a
member state against the will of a substantial part of the Austrian population, which voted for
the Freedom Party. Despite, the apparent unanimity at the EU intergovernmental level, the
sanctions have also generated some disagreements among member states. Italy, for instance,
reacted strongly to Chancellor Schroder's remarks that sanctions applied against Austria
should extend to Italy if the neo-fascist right were back to government and considered the
remark as an unacceptable interference in Italian national affairs. The Prime Minister of Italy
defended his enemies of the Right and said that none of the opposition forces in Italy profess a
neo-fascist ideology and none share any of the ideas expressed by Haider. Furthermore, France
and Belgium have been the most vocal in condemning the Austrian government due to the
domestic influence of their own national extreme right parties. Eastern applicant countries, for
their part, have reacted to sanctions against Austria with mixed feelings and a degree of
scepticism, in view of the domestic influence of their own extreme forces. While the initial
reaction was justified on the basis of moral values towards extreme right alternatives,
disagreements are explained on the basis of domestic public opinion in most of these countries.
So far, the EU has adopted a selective attitude towards extreme right forces. While their
values are condemned, extreme right parties are represented in the European elections and
hold seats in the European Parliament. Furthermore, EU countries did not adopt similar
sanctions against the government of B rlusconi's for including the Allianza Nazionale and the
Lega Nord. As regards extremism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the issue is
more or less a terra incognita for the European mainstream forces.
Based on the previous analysis on the European extreme right, one n eds o draw some
conclusions regarding the strategic significance of the current extreme right phenomenon, in
other words "what needs to be done":
First, the European elites should appreciate more adequately the new phenomenon by
examining the roots and causes of current discontent among European societies. It is clearly
not enough to perceive the current extreme right as a marginal and backward phenomenon.
European elites should disentangle their perception of the extreme right from the interwar
phenomenon, as it is clear that the conditions and factors conducive to the rise of the radical
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right have changed since the inter-war period. The understanding of this historical shift of the
international, socio-economic, political and cultural forces propelling this new phenomenon is
vital in order to deal with its implications.
Second, a different analysis of the Western from the Eastern European cases is needed. In the
Western European case we are dealing with established democracies whereas in the Eastern
European case with more fragile systems, prone to forces of extremism and radical
nationalism. What is therefore needed is a differentiated response in dealing with extreme right
manifestation in the two regions. Eastern enlargement does not automatically mean that
extreme right forces will be eradicated. The EU enlargement strategy will have to devise the
means of dealing with the potential of a eur -sceptic, ultra-nationalistic opposition in these
countries rather than strictly aiming at the adoption of the acquis communautaire by the
applicant countries. The wider concept of transition in Eastern Europe will have to be
constantly evaluated and differences within the Eastern European countries themselves will
have to be taken into account. On the contrary, conventional transition theory based on the
same strict criteria for all the countries in the region is bound to lead to overgen ralisations
and fallacies.
It is more than obvious that the influence of extreme right forces in Europe has not subsided
and might be even more powerful in the future when the countries of Eastern Europe become
members of the European Union. The success of the Western European (and especially
Austrian) extreme right raises the question of whether similar successful cases could emerge in
Central European countries. Animosities against the supra-national authority of the EU could
be stirred up by Central and Eastern European extreme right forces. The EU and the European
national governments will have to realise that extreme right forces are part of the political
landscape in Europe and may be critically influential in the transitional countries of Eastern
Europe. As Europe today is more united economically, politically and culturally more than any
other time in the past, right extremism in the West can have a significant impact in the East
and vice versa.
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